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What Explains Spread Credit Default Swaps Bid-Ask Spread? 
 
Chen Yaru 
 
Abstract 
    The pace at which the Credit default swaps (CDS) has been growing since its 
inception topped all projections. Despite the rapid growth, there is still room for 
enhancement of liquidity in the CDS market. Asymmetric information is another 
concern of investors in CDS market, however, some literature addressed that it may not 
be as serious as regarded. Bid-ask spreads is commonly used as a proxy of both liquidity 
and asymmetric information. Our empirical study confirms that CDS bid-ask spread has 
explanatory power to CDS premium. We then investigate the liquidity component in 
CDS bid-ask spreads. We use the bond age, bond amount, and bond time-to-maturity as 
the liquidity measure. We confirm that the bond market and CDS market are closely 
correlated. However, the composition of CDS bid-ask spread need to be further studied. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Credit derivatives have emerged as a remarkable and rapidly growing area in global 
derivatives and risk management practice which have been perhaps the most significant 
and successful financial innovation of the last decade. The growth of the global credit 
derivatives market continues to outstrip expectations. According to BBA (British 
Bankers’ Association) Credit Derivatives Report 2006, the outstanding notional amount 
of the market will be $20 trillion by the end of 2006 and will reach $33 trillion at the end 
of 2008 (see Figure 1). Single-name credit default swaps (CDS) still represent a 
substantial proportion of the market, though the share has fallen to a third (see Figure 2). 
CDS are the most liquid products among the credit derivatives currently traded which 
make up the bulk of trading volume in credit derivatives markets. Moreover, CDS along 
with total return swaps and credit spread options are the basic building blocks for more 
complex structured credit products 1. The majority of underlying CDS are rated at A and 
BBB (see Figure 3). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reports a 20% 
quarterly growth rate in the notional amount of credit derivatives, where CDS represent 
97% of the total amount. The CDS market has supplanted the bond market as the 
industry gauge for a borrower's credit quality.  
The remarkable growth of the CDS market not only attracts investors but also drives 
expanding academic studies on CDS. There has been a burgeoning literature that 
documents the pricing of CDS. Similar to other financial instruments, there are two 
approaches to price CDS, which are reduced-form models and structural-form models. 
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Structural-form models, whilst far from straightforward mathematically, are more 
grounded in economic fundamentals than reduced-form models and thus form a good 
starting point for a realistic description of credit dynamics. However, there are large 
discrepancies between the predictions of structural-form models and the observed credit 
spreads, which is also known as the credit premium puzzle (Amato and Remolona, 2003). 
Research has been done on calibrations that incorporate many realistic economic 
considerations 2. For example, Huang and Huang (2003) calibrate a wide range of 
structural models to be consistent with the data on historical default and loss experience. 
The reduced-form model developed by Hull and White (2000) is commonly accepted in 
pricing derivatives.  
Since CDS is designed to transfer credit risk, its price is regarded as a good measure 
of credit risk. Hence, the arbitrage opportunity between CDS price and credit spread of 
bonds is also being studied widely (Zhu, 2004, etc.). From another point of view, CDS 
tends to be more sensitive to credit events by design and a large portion of the users are 
regarded as informed traders.  Information transfer efficiency and price discovery effects, 
in particular, are issues of considerable interest. Blanco et al. (2005) test the theoretical 
equivalence of credit default swap spreads and credit spreads derived by Duffie (1999). 
Their empirical evidence strongly supports the parity relation as an equilibrium 
condition. However, dynamic deviations are observed in the short run, which indicates 
that CDS spreads lead credit spreads in the process of price discovery process. Acharya 
and Johnson (2007) examine the issue of the insider trading in CDS. They find 
significant incremental information revelation in the CDS market under circumstances 
 2
consistent with the use of non-public information by informed banks. However, the 
degree of asymmetric information does not adversely affect prices or liquidity in either 
the equity or credit markets in their empirical study. Tang and Yan (2006) systematically 
study the effects of liquidity in the CDS market and liquidity spillover from other 
markets on CDS spreads. Trading credit basis is a common strategy being used. An 
important consideration for investors trading the basis is an acceptable level of trading 
volume in the CDS market. Given that a reasonable amount of liquidity in CDS is a 
prerequisite for the development of more advanced structured products, the promotion of 
transparency and liquidity in the CDS space has been a key objective for market 
participants across the board.  
It is observed that the CDS bid-ask spread has declined over time with the growth of 
CDS market (see Figure 4). This is probably due to the exponential growth of CDS 
market. Bid-ask spread of equities are commonly used as liquidity proxy. However, bid-
ask spread is a noisy proxy of liquidity since it is also affected by asymmetric 
information. It is interesting to decompose the bid-ask spread to identify its determinants. 
The lack of study on CDS bid-ask spread is the result of data availability, which restrains 
the research on this topic. As derivatives are based on its fundamentals and as the 
information base and liquidity of CDS market have close relationships with both stock 
markets and bond markets, this study examines the determinants of CDS bid-ask spread 
by employing cross-sectional method.  
Empirical results show that bond liquidity measures have significant explanatory 
power to CDS bid-ask spread. It has been observed that from mid-2004, the CDS bid-ask 
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spread dropped to a very low level. Recently, the credit basis is narrower as the market 
matures (see Figure 5), which also shows signs that the bond market and CDS market 
are becoming more closely related. Our results show that the relationship between bond 
liquidity measure and CDS bid-ask spread does not change over time. 
Consistent with previous literature, our empirical results show that there is a positive 
relationship between CDS bid-ask spread and leverage ratio, a negative relationship 
between CDS bid-ask spread and firm size, as well as a positive relationship between 
CDS bid-ask spread and option implied volatility. A positive relationship between the 
liquidity of CDS and the liquidity of bond market has been found using bond 
outstanding amount as liquidity proxy. However, this positive relationship is not so clear 
when use bond age or bond time-to-maturity as liquidity proxies. Data limitation is still a 
challenge of our study. The composition of CDS bid-ask spread requires further study. 
Anyway, we confirm the significant relationship between the CDS bid-ask spread and 
bond liquidity measure. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some background 
information on the CDS market. Section 3 covers the literature reviews. Section 4 
describes the data used for this study. Section 5 discusses the method used for our 
empirical analysis. Section 6 demonstrates the empirical results. Section 7 conclusion 
and limitation. 
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2. Credit Default Swaps 
 
Credit default swaps are structured as instruments which make an agreed payoff upon 
the occurrence of a credit event. In other words, in a CDS, the protection seller and the 
protection buyer enter a contract which documents that the protection seller compensates 
the protection buyer if a default event occurs before maturity of the contract. If there is 
no default event before maturity, the protection seller pays nothing. In return, the 
protection buyer typically pays a constant quarterly fee to the protection seller until 
default or maturity, whichever comes first. This quarterly payment, usually expressed as 
a percentage of its notional value, is the CDS spread or premium.  
The payment following the occurrence of a credit event is either repayment at par 
against physical delivery of a reference obligation (physical settlement) or the notional 
principle minus the post default market value of the reference obligation (cash 
settlement). In practice, physical settlement is the dominant settlement mechanism, 
though the proportion has dropped to 73% (according to BBA Credit Derivative Report 
2006). The delivery of obligations in case of physical settlement can be restricted to a 
specific instrument, though usually the buyer may choose from a list of qualifying 
obligations, irrespective of currency and maturity as long as they rank pari passu with 
(have the same seniority as) the reference obligation. This latter feature is commonly 
referred to as the cheapest-to-deliver option. Theoretically, all deliverable obligations 
should have the same price at default and the delivery option would be worthless. 
However, in some credit events, e.g., a restructuring, this option is favorable to the buyer, 
 5
since he can deliver the cheapest bonds to the seller. Counterparties can limit the value 
of the cheapest-to-deliver option by restricting the range of deliverable obligations, e.g., 
to non-contingent, interest-paying bonds.  
As with all other financial markets, the liquidity and efficiency of aligning buyers and 
sellers depends on consistent, reliable and understandable legal documentation. The 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has been a strong force in 
stabilizing the uniformity of documentation of CDS products through the assistance and 
support of its members: primarily the dealer community. At this point, there are settled 
forms of template documents for single-name corporate CDS, basket trades or single-
names, and CDS on Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) and Residential 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS). In addition, a form of CDS on Asset-Backed 
Securities (ABS) confirmation is near completion and is expected to be followed closely 
by a form of index (CMBX and ABX) 3 confirmations. CDS on ABS and Mortgage-
Backed Securities (MBS) are typically documented under an ISDA form pay-as-you-go 
(physical settlement) confirmation (the pay-as-you-go (PAUG) dealer form), which is 
widely accepted in the marketplace.  
The Credit Definitions by ISDA allow specification of the following credit events: 
1. Bankruptcy.  
2. Failure to pay above a nominated threshold (say in excess of US$1 million) 
after expiration of a specific grace period (say, 2 to 5 business days). 
3. Obligation default or obligation acceleration. 
4. Repudiation or moratorium (for sovereign entities). 
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5. Restructuring. 
    There are significant issues in defining the credit events. This reflects the 
heterogeneous nature of credit obligations. In general, items 1, 2 and 5 are commonly 
used as credit events in CDS for firms. Four types of restructuring have been given by 
ISDA: full restructuring; modified restructuring (only bonds with maturity shorter than 
30 months can be delivered); modified-modified restructuring (restructured obligations 
with maturity shorter than 60 months and other obligations with maturity shorter than 30 
months can be delivered); and no restructuring. 
    CDS are actively traded on corporate, bank, and sovereign debt, and the typical 
contract is written on notional amounts of US$10 million with a five-year maturity 4. 
Most of the contracts are drawn to reference bonds by a single issuer, that is, single 
name contracts. When contracts refer to multiple issuers, they are referred to as portfolio 
names. The most popular portfolio transaction is probably the first-to-default basket. In 
these contracts, protection is sold on a basket of credit default swaps. Payments are 
terminated when the first credit event occurs or after a fixed period of time.  
 
3. Related Literature 
 
The rapidly expanding credit derivatives market has attracted the spotlight. A vast 
growth of literature has been devoted to the studies of CDS market. However, given the 
short history of the credit derivatives market and the limited data availability, there has 
been limited empirical work in this arena. The relatively small empirical literature has 
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focused on the determinants of CDS spreads and their role in price discovery in the 
changes of credit condition. Hull and White (2000) provide a methodology for valuing 
single name credit default swaps without considering counterparty default risk. They 
assume that default probabilities, interest rates, and recovery rates are independent. The 
sensitivity test of expected recovery rate shows that the valuation of a vanilla CDS is 
relatively insensitive to the expected recovery rate, while it is not the case for a binary 
CDS 5. Hull and White (2001) extend their previous paper by taking account of 
counterparty default risk and allow the contingent on defaults by multiple reference 
entities. Assuming that the creditworthiness of companies can be defined by credit 
indices, they argue that if the default correlation between the two parties is positive, then 
the default of the counterparty will result in a positive replacement cost for the 
protection buyer. Their results show that the swap rates increase with credit index 
correlation and the rates may differ by more than 10% when the protection seller’s credit 
rating decreases from AAA to BBB and the value of the credit index correlation is 0.6 or 
higher 6.  
Houweling and Vorst (2005) implement a set of reduced-form models on market CDS 
quotes and corporate bond quotes. They find that the reduced-form model outperforms 
directly comparing bonds’ credit spreads to CDS spreads. They focus on the pricing 
performance of the model and the choice of benchmark yield curve. They show that 
swap or repo rates are better proxies for default-free interest rates relative to the treasury 
rate. Their study empirically confirms that financial markets no longer regard Treasury 
bonds as the default-free benchmark. Hull et al. (2004) examine the relationship between 
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CDS spreads and bond yields and research benchmark risk-free rates used by 
participants in the derivative market. They also show that swap rates have better 
“goodness-to-fit” when compared to risk-free rates. Their empirical evidence also 
suggests that CDS market anticipates credit rating announcements, especially negative 
rating events.  
Norden and Weber (2004) analyze the response of stock and CDS markets to rating 
announcements made by the three major rating agencies during the period 2000-2002. 
They find significant abnormal returns in both markets 60-90 days before actual 
downgrades and reviews for downgrade. Both markets show a significant announcement 
window effect but no significant reaction afterwards. The CDS market reacts earlier than 
the stock market with respect to reviews for downgrade by S&P and Moody's.  
Blanco et al. (2005) test the theoretical equivalence of credit default swap spreads and 
credit spreads derived by Duffie (1999). Their empirical evidence strongly supports the 
parity relation as an equilibrium condition. However, dynamic deviations are observed in 
the short run, which indicates that CDS spreads lead credit spreads in the price discovery 
process. For the 27 firms for which the equilibrium relation holds, the CDS market 
contributes on average around 80% of price discovery. 
Zhu (2006) not only examine the long-term pricing accuracy in the CDS market 
relative to the bond market, but also look into the underlying factors that explain the 
price differentials and exploring the short-term dynamic linkages between the two 
markets in the context of a time series framework. The panel data study and the VECM 
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analysis both suggest that short-term deviations between the two markets are largely due 
to the higher responsiveness of CDS spreads to changes in credit condition.  
Longstaff et al. (2005) examine weekly lead-lag relationships between CDS spread 
changes, corporate bond spreads, and stock returns of US firms in a VAR framework. 
They find that both stock and CDS markets lead the corporate bond market which 
provides support for the hypothesis that information seems to flow first into credit 
derivatives and stock markets and then into corporate bond markets. However, there are 
many exceptions to this rule of thumb. Moreover, in their sample there is no clear lead of 
the stock market with respect to the CDS market and vice versa.  
Most of the empirical studies focus on rating events, while Jorion and Zhang (2006) 
first document the intra-industry credit contagion effect using CDS and stock markets. 
They examine the information transfer effect of credit events across the industry, as 
captured by the CDS and stock markets. The empirical evidence strongly supports the 
domination of contagion effects over competition effects for Chapter 11 bankruptcies 
and competition effects over contagion effects for Chapter 7 bankruptcies. The study of 
jump event, which is a large jump in a company’s CDS spread, lead to the strongest 
evidence of credit contagion across the industry. Further, they show that contagion 
effects are better captured in the CDS market than in the stock market.  
Zhang et al. (2006) include jump risks of individual firms to explain credit default 
swap spreads. They adopt both historical and realized measures as proxies for various 
aspects of the jump risks. They use high-frequency equity returns of individual firms to 
detect the realized jumps on each day. They find empirical evidence to support that long-
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run historical volatility, short-run realized volatility, and various jump-risk measures all 
have statistically significant and economically meaningful effects on credit spreads. 
More important, the sensitivities of credit spreads to volatility and jump risk are greatly 
dependent on the credit grade of the entities. Moreover, the relationship is nonlinear. 
Equity jump may affect credit spread in a nonlinear, asymmetric way; negative jumps 
tend to have larger effects. They calibrate a series of models—Merton (1974), jump-
diffusion, stochastic volatility, and jump-diffusion stochastic volatility (JDSV). Their 
calibration results suggest that the adoption of the JDSV model can significantly 
improve the empirical performance of structural models. Nevertheless, the JDSV model 
cannot completely resolve the credit premium puzzle.  
Berndt et al. (2006) investigate the source for common variation in the portion of 
returns observed in U.S. credit markets that is not related to changes in risk-free rates or 
expected default losses. They extract a latent common component from firm-specific 
changes in default risk premium that is orthogonal to known systematic risk factors from 
2001 to 2004. Asset pricing tests using returns on Bloomberg-NASD corporate bond 
indices suggest that latent changes in default risk premium (DRP) factor is priced in the 
corporate bond market. A cross-sectional analysis of Merrill Lynch corporate bond 
portfolios sorted on either industry, maturity or rating supports these findings. They find 
compelling support for common time-series variation in firm-specific changes in default 
risk premia. Up to 42% of this co-movement can be due to exposure to other known 
sources of common variation. They then develop a theoretical framework that, while the 
DRP factor is part of the pricing kernel, supports their empirical finding; a maximum of 
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35% of the residual is explained by DRP factor. It shows that the DRP factor captures 
the jump-to-default risk associated with market-wide credit events. While they find that 
DRP factor is priced in the market for corporate bonds, they find limited support for a 
similar conclusion in the equity markets. 
There is very little literature that addresses the bid-ask spread of CDS price. An 
exception is Acharya and Johnson (2007). They quantify insider trading in CDS market 
by incremental information revelation in the CDS market using news in the stock 
markets as a benchmark for public information. They report evidence consistent with the 
occurrence of informed revision of quotes. Information revelation in the CDS market is 
asymmetric. They show that the information flow from CDS market to the stock market 
is greater for negative credit news and for entities that subsequently experience adverse 
shocks using a credit-condition dummy. Commercial banks that have an ongoing lending 
relationship with the company are identified as insiders. Using this as a proxy of 
informed insider, they find that the degree of information flow increases with the 
number of banks that have ongoing lending (and hence monitoring) relations with a 
given entity. Robustness tests show that the relationship is not affected by non-
informational trade, liquidity levels in the CDS and stock markets, and the level of risk 
of the credit. However, they find no evidence that the degree of insider activity, in their 
framework, adversely affects prices or liquidity in either the equity or the credit markets. 
Moreover, they reported that the percentage bid-ask spread has no explanatory power for 
the level of CDS prices. They find that the CDS market lead stock market in information 
transmission. Furthermore, their results suggest that trading restrictions on the activity of 
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commercial banks, the potentially informed players in these markets, could result in a 
reduction in the liquidity. 
Tang and Yan (2006) systematically study the effects of liquidity in the CDS market 
and liquidity spillover from other markets on CDS spread using a large data set. They 
find substantial liquidity spillover from bond, stock and option markets to the CDS 
market. To isolate the effects of liquidity and liquidity spillover, they control other 
fundamental determinants of CDS spreads. Leverage ratio, asset volatility, jump 
component, book-to-market ratio and firm size are used as fundamental determinants. 
They find that systematic liquidity is priced beyond the liquidity level. They also find 
that liquidity risk is more important for more active CDS while liquidity level is more 
important for infrequently traded CDS.  
Data limitations pose a challenge to the quantification of liquidity in the CDS markets. 
It is nearly impossible to directly use proxies in the CDS markets to explain the bid-ask 
spread of CDS quotes. To meet this challenge, we utilize the fact that the worth of CDS 
depends primarily on the value of the underlying reference entity. Since all the 
companies in my sample have actively traded equity and option, we use fundamental 
information of the entities. The credit condition of an entity can be largely measured by 
its firm size, leverage and volatility. Furthermore, Tang and Yan (2006) have 
demonstrated liquidity spillover from other markets on CDS spreads. We use the total 
amount of outstanding bonds, the age of outstanding bonds and the maturity of bonds to 
measure the basic liquidity characteristic of bonds to study whether they have 
explanatory power to the liquidity in CDS market. 
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4. Sample and Data 
 
In this paper, we include CDS quotes written on U.S. entities (excluding sovereign 
entities) and denominated in U.S. dollars. We eliminate the subordinate class of CDS 
contracts because there are relatively less CDS written on subordinate obligations. We 
focus on five-year single-name CDS contracts because they are most popular in the U.S. 
market 7. After matching the CDS data with other information, such as balance sheet and 
bond characteristic information (discussed later), we are left with 124 entities in our 
study 8. This is a relatively large pool of entities as compared to other empirical studies 
on CDS.  
Our sample covers from June 2002 to April 2006. The entities must satisfy the 
following requirements:  
(1) non-sovereign US entities 
(2) fundamental data are available from Compustat database 
(3) has at least 100 observations of CDS quotes and option implied volatility 
(4) bond issues information is available from Mergent Fixed Income Securities 
Database (FISD) 
The CDS quotes are collected from Bloomberg terminal. The CDS data in Bloomberg 
is from CMA DataVisionTM composite prices—prices that are sourced from the front 
offices of the leading investment banks, hedge funds and asset managers. More details 
about the CDS quotes from Bloomberg are in Appendix A.  
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The statistics of the CDS quotes are summarized in Table 1. It shows that the CDS 
bid-ask is positively skewed. Categorizing the sample by rating (using the first 
observation of the rating without considering the rating changes over time), it shows that 
mean, median, first quartile, third quartile, and standard deviation all increase as the 
rating decreases. However, the minimum and maximum values of the entire sample lie in 
group 2.  
Option implied volatility is also collected from Bloomberg. Implied volatility is a 
measure of a security’s expected volatility as reflected by the market price of the traded 
options on that security. The theoretical price of an option is a function of the underlying 
stocks, the risk-free rate, and time to expiration (p= f (S, X, v, r, t)). Implied volatility is 
calculated by using the market price of the option in the above equation. The implied 
volatility best price supplied by Bloomberg which uses the underlying last trade price 
and the option best price, instead of historical data on the price of the underlying stocks. 
The bond information data, total amount of the outstanding bonds, the average age of 
the outstanding bonds and the average time-to-maturity of all active bonds, are from 
Mergent FISD bond issuer file. The total amount of outstanding bonds is the sum of all 
the outstanding bonds at a specific time. The bond age is the arithmetical average of the 
age of all active bonds. Bond maturity is calculated by taking the simple average of the 
time-to-maturity of all active bonds.    
Fundamental information, leverage ratio and firm size (proxied by deflated total assets) 
of firms, are downloaded from Compustat database quarterly industry file. The CPI that 
is used to deflate the total assets is downloaded from the website of Federal Reserve 
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Bank of St. Louis. To eliminate the inflated effect, we divide total assets by CPI, which 
is used as a proxy of firm size. Larger firms are less likely to default and are their 
equities are more heavily traded and hence more liquid. The leverage is measured by the 
ratio of book value of debt and market value of equity: 
Book Value of DebtLeverage =  
Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt
   
The market value of equity is calculated as stock price multiplied by number of shares 
outstanding. The book value of debt is the sum of short-term debt (Compustat quarterly 
file data item 45) and long-term debt (item 51). This is the measure customarily used in 
the literature. Debt level is only available at quarterly frequency. We replace missing 
value with the previous debt level 9. Table 2 provides summary statistics for the 
variables in our sample. 
It is interesting to get a rough idea of the relationship between CDS bid-ask spread 
and independent variables used. The correlations between CDS bid-ask spread and the 
independent variables are summarized in Table 3.  
Table 3 shows that bond age, bond issue size and bond maturity are negatively 
correlated to CDS bid-ask spread in the whole sample period. Leverage is positively 
correlated to CDS bid-ask spread. Intuitively, the higher the leverage ratio, the higher the 
risk and hence the higher the CDS bid-ask spread. A similar argument can be applied to 
option implied volatility.  
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5. Empirical Methodology  
 
5.1 CDS Bid-ask Spread and CDS Premium 
 
As we all know, CDS bid-ask spread, which may significantly affect the CDS price 
level, is highly important in the CDS market. Thus, it is necessary to test the relationship 
between CDS bid-ask spread and CDS price empirically. We regress CDS price on CDS 
bid-ask spread with different approaches. Furthermore, to control the firm-specific risk, 
option implied volatility is added into the regressions.  
Before conducting the regressions, we perform ADF test and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit 
root test to check the stationarity of CDS price and CDS bid-ask spread. From the results 
of the ADF test ( t-statistic: 1.53) and the PP test ( t-statistic: 2.23), we cannot reject the 
unit root null hypothesis of the cross-sectional mean of CDS bid-ask spread at 5% level. 
Similar results are found in the cross-sectional mean of CDS price (ADF test t-statistic: 
1.51, PP test t-statistic: 2.49). Furthermore, the mean CDS price and the mean CDS bid-
ask spread are cointegrated at 1% level (t-statistic: 45.02). However, the change in CDS 
price and the change in CDS bid-ask spread are stationary at 1% level in both ADF test 
and PP test. Considering the firm-level time series regression used below, unit root tests 
are also applied to every firm in the sample respectively. From Table 5, CDS premium 
and CDS bid-ask spread are cointegrated in 97 of the 124 cases with Johansen trace test. 
However, the change in CDS price and CDS bid-ask spread are stationary. Therefore, we 
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use the changes of the variables, instead of levels, in the regressions. The panel data 
model is as follows: 
it it itCDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  +    (1)itα β ε∆ ∆  
The firm-level time series model is as follows: 
it 1 it tCDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  +    (2)t tα β ε∆ ∆  
Both panel data regression and firm-level time series regressions show that liquidity is 
priced in CDS price using bid-ask spread as a liquidity measure. The panel data 
regression results show that a one basis point change in CDS bid-ask spread would cause 
about 0.72 basis point change in CDS price with t-statistic more than 45. In firm-level 
time series regression, a one basis point change in CDS bid-ask spread on average would 
cause about 0.57 basis point change in CDS price. We then divide the sample into three 
groups by the mean leverage ratio with the least volatile firms in group 1. Results show 
that the impact of CDS bid-ask spread on CDS price is more significant in the case of 
heavily leveraged firms. Furthermore, we divide the sample into three groups according 
to total assets with the smallest firms in group 1. Consistent with our expectations, CDS 
bid-ask spread has more significant impact on CDS price to smaller firms. Finally, we 
divide the sample into three groups according to credit rating with group 1 rated above A, 
group 2 rated at BBB, group 3 rated at BB or B. We find that the CDS bid-ask spread 
has less significant impact on CDS price in group 2. This is because most of the entities 
are in group 2. These results confirm that the CDS bid-ask spread significantly affects 
CDS price.  
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We then control the market risk by including the change in option implied volatility 
into the regression. The panel data model is as follows: 
it 1, it 2 , it itCDS M id Price  =  + CDS Bid-ask Spread  + OPIV    (3)it itα β β∆ ∆ ∆ ε+
 
The results show that 1β  is still positive and significantly different from zero. 
Similarly, we include the change in option implied volatility in the firm-level time 
series model, which is as follows: 
it 1 it 2 it tCDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  + OPIV  +    (4)t t tα β β∆ ∆ ∆ ε  
We conduct this regression with every firm. After which, we take the mean of the 
coefficients and calculate the T-value. Our results show that the estimate of 1β  is 
positive and significantly different from zero even the change in option implied volatility 
is included in the regression. This result further confirms that CDS bid-ask spread is 
important to CDS price.  
Finally, we apply cross-sectional method both with and without the change of option 
implied volatility. We first run daily cross-sectional regression to get the estimates and 
then we calculate the mean of the estimates and the T-value. The models are as follows: 
t 1 t tCDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  +    (5)t tα β ε∆ ∆  
t 1 t 2 t tCDS Mid Price  =  + CDS Bid-ask Spread  + OPIV    (6)t t tα β β∆ ∆ ∆ ε+  
The results of these regressions are reported in Panel F Table 4. 1β  is significantly 
different from zero in both cases, which indicates that the change of CDS bid-ask is 
important to the change of CDS price. All our models show that 1β  is positive and 
significantly different from zero.  
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5.2 CDS Bid–ask Spread and Liquidity Measure 
  
Derivatives are based on its fundamentals. It is believed that CDS market is strongly 
correlated to other financial markets. Tan and Yan (2006) have shown that liquidity of 
CDS market is significantly related to the liquidity of stock, bond and option markets. 
However, the relationships are unclear. In times of economic distress, we often observe 
investors rebalance their portfolios towards less risky and more liquid securities, 
especially in fixed income markets. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as flight-
to-quality and flight-to-liquidity respectively. While the economic motives of these two 
phenomena are clearly distinct from each other, empirically disentangling flight-to-
quality from flight-to-liquidity is difficult. As Ericsson and Renault (2006) show in the 
context of the U.S. corporate bond market, these two attributes of a fixed income 
security (credit quality and liquidity) are usually positively correlated. For example, U.S. 
Treasuries have less credit risk and are more liquid than corporate bonds. CDS is an 
infant market which is based mainly on bonds. Hence, it is better to take both flight-to-
quality and flight-to-liquidity into consideration.  
In view of that, the fundamentals of a firm which measure the quality of the reference 
entity are taken into account. More specifically, the size of a firm is the first element that 
is regarded as a measure of quality. It has been proven that larger firms are less likely to 
be distressed and more likely to stay healthy when the market plummets. On the other 
hand, larger firms have more depth market and hence the securities of these firms are 
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more liquid. Larger firms would tend to have higher price level and lower bid-ask spread. 
Therefore, we use total assets rectified by CPI as the measure of firm size.  
Leverage ratio is another measure of a firm’s quality. High leveraged firms are 
regarded to have higher risk. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that high 
leveraged firms are more likely to incur financial distress and are harder to recover from 
shocks. In this respect, the leverage ratio is positively related to the bid-ask spread.  
The credit market is more sensitive to credit events as has been verified. Jump risks 
have been discussed (see Collin-Dufresne, et al. (2003), Zhang, et al. (2006)).  Volatility 
is the common proxy of jumps. Volatility is also an input of derivatives pricing. It is 
regarded that option implied volatility, among the different volatility measures, can price 
CDS level more accurately (see Cao, et al. (2006)). Therefore, we use option implied 
volatility as a measure of jump risk. The higher the implied volatility level, the larger the 
CDS bid-ask spread. Volatility is a risk measure since more volatile firms are more 
likely to plunge into distress.  
Total bond outstanding amount is widely used as a liquidity measure of bond market. 
It is believed that the larger the outstanding amount of bonds the more liquid the bond. 
Bond age is also accepted as a bond liquidity measure. The rationale is that investors 
tend to fall into a buy-and-hold strategy with older bonds. In contrast, the on-the-run 
bonds are likely to be used as short-term investment and hence are more heavily traded. 
The time-to-maturity also has been used as a liquidity measure of bonds. Empirical 
results show that the longer the time-to-maturity the more liquid the bond. However, the 
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relationship between the liquidity of bond market and the liquidity of CDS market is 
unclear. There may be two possibilities.  
First, investors who hold too much credit risk and would like to reduce their bearing 
of credit risk have two choices: firstly, sell the bonds directly on the market; secondly, 
buy the CDS of the reference entity. From this standpoint, buying CDS is one substitute 
of selling bonds. If the bond is liquid and the investors could sell them easily without 
much loss, then there will be less demand for CDS. Otherwise, there will be more 
demand for the CDS. The CDS market is a demand-driven market as has been reported 
by BBA. As such, we would find that the negative relationship between the liquidity of 
CDS and the liquidity of bonds. We may also find a negative relationship between bond 
age and CDS bid-ask spread, a positive relationship between bond outstanding amount 
and CDS bid-ask spread, as well as a positive relationship between bond time-to-
maturity and CDS bid-ask spread. 
Second, for the investors who hold few credit risk assets and would like to enhance 
their returns through bearing more credit risk, they have two ways: either to buy the 
bond directly from the bond market or to enter into CDS contracts as sellers. However, if 
the bond market is illiquid, it will be difficult and risky to enter into bond markets. 
Therefore, entering the CDS market as a seller is a better choice. In this sense, there will 
be more supply of CDS in the market. If this is the case, there is a negative relationship 
between the bond liquidity and CDS liquidity. Therefore, the opposite relationship 
between bond liquidity measures and CDS bid-ask spread may be found in contrast to 
the previous case.  
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Furthermore, credit rating is also an important concern. Credit ratings provided by the 
top rating agencies are regarded as a unanimous indication of both the quality of the firm 
and the liquidity of its securities. Investment grade bonds and speculate grade bonds 
have significantly different performances. Even with inter-investment grades, different 
rating scores may be accompanied with distinct trading volumes and bid-ask spreads, etc. 
Empirical results show that bonds rated at AA are most liquid in bond market. 
Theoretically, higher rating bonds are more liquid with higher quality. The CDS market 
is sensitive to credit events. Credit rating changes or even the reviews of credit change 
will significantly change the bond quality. Empirical results by Norden, and Weber, 
(2004) show that the CDS market and stock market anticipate not only rating 
downgrades but also reviews for downgrade by the three rating agencies. Nevertheless, 
the CDS market reacts earlier than the stock market. In view of these, we categorize 
entities based on their rating scores. 
To investigate whether fundamental variables and bond liquidity measures have 
explanatory power on CDS bid-ask spread and the signs of the relationships, we apply 
cross-sectional method, that is, we first run daily cross-sectional regression to get the 
estimates and then take the average of the estimates and calculate the T-value. The 
model can be written as follows: 
i 0 1 2 3 4
5 6
CDS B/A Spread
                                                           
                                                                          
i i i i
i i i
Age AMT MRT LEV
Assets OPIV
β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +
   1,2,...,    (7)    i N=  
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The data we have is panel data. There are both cross-sectional and time series 
information in it. We can look at the question from the dimension of time series or the 
dimension of cross-sections respectively. Another way is that we look at the question 
from the dimension of time series and the dimension of cross-sections at the same time 
by applying panel data method. However, previously, we found that the CDS bid-ask 
spread is nonstationary for most of the entities. Therefore, we cannot employ the time 
series and panel data method directly. In this case, we shall employ the cross-sectional 
method. 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
CDS are based on debts and/or loans of the entities. Therefore, it is believed that the 
stock market, bond market and option market have a significant influence on the CDS 
market. Our empirical study confirms it.  
In our empirical study, we divide the sample by ratings: group 1 with firms rated 
above A; group 2 includes firms rated at BBB, and group 3 contains firms rated at BB or 
B. Although there may be rating changes in the sample period, we classify the reference 
firms using only the initial rating without considering the rating changes. In addition, we 
divide our sample into three groups according to the mean option implied volatility of 
the reference entity. Option implied volatility can be used as a proxy of a firm’s risk. As 
we know, CDS is sensitive to a firm’s risk. That is why we divide our sample in such a 
way. 
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Table 6 specifies the cross-sectional regression results. We run cross-sectional 
regression with the whole sample as well as the different groups that are grouped by 
credit rating and option implied volatility respectively. All variables are significant in the 
overall regression (see Panel A, Table 6). Both bond age and bond amount have 
significant negative explanatory power. Empirically, on-the-run bonds are more liquid 
than off-the-run bonds. Older bonds are usually less liquid since investors tend to fall 
into buy-and-hold strategy. In view of that, for investors who would like to bear the 
credit risk to enhance their returns, CDS may be a better choice. There are at least two 
reasons: first, older bonds are illiquid and probably unavailable to investors; second, 
there is a leverage effect on CDS market which means that investors do not have to pour 
in large amounts of cash as they have to do in the bond market. For investors who 
already have the bonds and would not like to bear the credit risk, CDS is also a better 
choice as compared to selling the bonds directly in the bond market. The reason is that it 
is too costly to drop out of an illiquid corporate bond market. From this standpoint, CDS 
is a substitute for older bonds. Hence, if the reference entity has older bonds, the CDS 
bid-ask spread will be lower. 
Bonds with a larger outstanding amount are more liquid. Similarly, CDS which are 
based on bonds with large issuance size are more liquid. Although it seems contradictory 
to the previous argument, it is not. If the bond’s outstanding amount is small, it is 
unlikely that investors hold too much credit risk of the firm; hence, the requisite of 
hedging it is lower. There would also not be any active CDS based on it.  
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The estimate of time-to-maturity of bonds is significantly positive. This indicates that 
CDS based on bonds with longer time-to-maturity tend to have higher bid-ask spread. 
The relationship between the liquidity of bonds and their time-to-maturity is not very 
clear. However, some empirical studies show that there is a negative relationship 
between the liquidity of bonds and their time-to-maturity. On the other hand, time-to-
maturity is an option to investors whose value decreases with time. Longer time-to-
maturity is more attractive to investors. CDS based on these bonds are more liquid either 
because they would like to hedge credit risk or to enhance returns. In this sense, there is 
a positive relationship between the liquidity of the CDS market and the liquidity of the 
bond market. 
Most of the reference firms are rated at BBB (i.e., Rating Group 2), and similar results 
are found in this group. The difference is that the estimate of time-to-maturity of the 
bonds is significantly negative. This result is similar to the result between the liquidity of 
bond and its time-to-maturity. 
Firm fundamentals are significant with expected signs. That is, leverage ratio and 
option implied volatility have a positive sign which means higher leveraged and more 
volatile firms have higher CDS bid-ask spread since they are regarded as more risky. 
Total assets as a measure of firm size has a negative sign as expected because larger 
firms are more stable and less risky because they are less likely to suffer heavy shocks 
by the market. Larger firm size also means more securities of these firms are available, 
hence they are more liquid. 
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Across the rating groups, we find that the liquidity of the bond market and the 
liquidity of the CDS market are positively related. For firms rated above A, the older the 
bonds, the larger the CDS bid-ask spread, that is, CDS based on older bonds, whose 
credit rating are above A, are less liquid. Similarly, older bonds are less liquid in the 
bond market. The CDS based on the reference entity, whose outstanding bonds amount 
is larger, has lower CDS bid-ask spread.  Bonds with larger issue size are more liquid in 
the bond market. Therefore, CDS whose reference entity has liquid bonds is more liquid. 
The results for the group with credit rating at BB or B are insignificant. It is probably 
because only 20 firms from our sample are in the group and hence the sample size is not 
large enough to do a cross-sectional regression. Therefore, the results for this group are 
biased.  
Figure 6 displays the changes of the variables across the rating groups. It reflects the 
changes of the results across the rating groups. Firms with credit rating above A are 
large firms with low leverage ratio. At the same time, these firms have a large amount of 
outstanding bonds with the age similar to bonds issued by firms with lower ratings. In 
view of the characteristics of firms rated above A, we are confident to say that bonds 
issued by these firms are more liquid as well as CDS based on these firms. The positive 
relationship between the liquidity of CDS and the liquidity of the bond market are 
confirmed using the bonds outstanding amount as the liquidity proxy. 
Figure 4 shows that CDS bid-ask spread dropped to a relatively low level at about July 
2004 and kept at that level afterwards. The BBA credit derivatives survey reported a 
similar phenomenon. The liquidity of CDS has experienced breathtaking growth which 
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is due to the tremendous growth of the CDS market. In view of this, we shall investigate 
the problem by zooming into different time periods. Accordingly, we divide our sample 
into two sub-sample periods on July 1st, 2004. The results are reported in Panel D Table 
6. We find that the results do not change over time, which confirms the previous 
findings.
 
7. Conclusion and limitation 
 
Bid-ask spreads have two components: asymmetry information and liquidity. As an 
emerging financial instrument, the remarkable growth of CDS continues to outstrip 
expectations, even though the breathtaking rate of increase in its liquidity is still a 
concern to investors. As documented by Acharya and Johnson (2007), asymmetry 
information is a lesser concern than liquidity. This study focuses on the liquidity 
component in the bid-ask spreads.  
Data limitation poses a challenge in discussing the component of CDS bid-ask spread. 
We take this challenge by studying the liquidity of bonds issued by the reference entity 
of the CDS. The bond market and the CDS market are closely correlated. There are two 
possibilities of the relationship between the liquidity of CDS and the liquidity of bonds. 
On the one hand, there is a positive relationship between the liquidity of CDS and the 
liquidity of bonds, that is, a reference entity with liquid bonds comes along with a liquid 
CDS, and vice versa. On the other hand, there is a negative relationship between the 
liquidity of CDS and the liquidity of bonds, that is, a reference entity with illiquid bonds 
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comes along with a liquid CDS. Overall, we find that there is a positive relationship 
between the liquidity of CDS and the liquidity of bonds. Though the CDS have 
experienced tremendous growth in the past years, the market size is still important to the 
liquidity of the market. This is confirmed by the negative relationship between CDS bid-
ask spread and bond outstanding amount as well as the negative relationship between 
CDS bid-ask spread and firm size. We find a significantly positive relationship between 
the liquidity of CDS and the liquidity of bonds using the outstanding amount of bonds as 
the liquidity proxy. We find a negative relationship between CDS bid-ask spread and 
bond outstanding amount, which confirms the positive relationship between the liquidity 
of CDS and the liquidity of bonds. As the CDS market becomes mature, the CDS are 
more likely to be supplements than substitutes of bonds though at the earlier stage they 
tend to be substitutes.  
We find that consistent with previous literature, there is a positive relationship 
between CDS bid-ask spread and leverage ratio, a negative relationship between CDS 
bid-ask spread and firm size, as well as a positive relationship between CDS bid-ask 
spread and option implied volatility. We also find that there is a significant negative 
relationship between CDS bid-ask spread and bond issue size as well as a negative 
relationship between CDS bid-ask spread and bond time-to-maturity.  
However, the availability of data restricts our study. The composition of the CDS bid-
ask spread is far from being answered. It is important to continue on this study to find 
out a clearer composition of the CDS bid-ask spread upon the availability of relative data. 
This study confirms that the liquidity of CDS is a critical issue to the CDS market, and 
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shows the significant relationship between the liquidity of the CDS market and the 
liquidity of the bond market.  
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Note: 
 
1. Total return swap is the generic name for any non traditional swap where one 
party agrees to pay the other the “total return” of a defined underlying asset. 
Credit spread products are generally forwards or options on the credit spread on 
credit sensitive assets which allow the separate trading of this attribute of assets 
for the purpose of risk reduction, speculation or return enhancement.  
2. For example, the equity volatility and jump risks studied by Zhang, B., H. Zhou, 
and H. Zhu (2006). Blanco, R., S. Brennan, and I. Marsh (2005) analyze the 
dynamic relationships between investment grade bonds and CDS.  
3. The CMBX is a group of indices consisting of 25 Commercial Mortgage-Backed 
Securities (CMBS) tranches, sorted by rating class. What differentiates the 
CMBX from other CMBS indices is that market participants can trade a CMBX 
index as a CDS contract. The CDBX belongs to the same index family as the 
indices for corporate CDS, the DJ CDX. Using the CMBX, one can either gain 
synthetic risk exposure to a portfolio of CMBS by “selling protection” or take a 
short position by “buying protection.” The contract for the CMBX is designed to 
closely mirror the cash flow of the portfolio of cash CMBS bonds. 
The ABX.HE indices are part of the DJ.CDX index family owned and managed 
by CDS IndexCo. Markit serves as the Administration and Calculation Agent for 
the indices. The ABX.HE indices use the pay-as-you-go CDS template from 
ISDA, with (1) Writedown, (2) Principal Shortfall, and (3) Interest Shortfall, as 
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Floating Payment Events. The Fixed Cap applies to Interest Shortfall. The three 
floating payment events may be reversed (i.e. reimbursement). The physical 
settlement option and the Step-up provisions are not applicable. Each index is a 
static portfolio of 20 home equity loan ABS deals, where the notional amount 
mirrors amortization of the reference bonds. Market quotes are based on price, 
not on spread. Protection buyers pay monthly premium based on a predetermined 
Fixed Rate. 
4. Although a large number of contracts are written on 5-year maturity, investment 
banks also write CDS contracts on the notional amounts and maturities specified 
by their clients. For corporate and financial institutions, however, trading activity 
is the greatest for five-year contracts. 
5. A binary credit default swap is structured similarly to a regular credit default 
swap except that the payoff is a fixed dollar amount.  
6. Credit index correlation is the instantaneous correlation between the credit 
indices for companies j and k. When j and k are public companies, we can 
assume that the credit index correlation is the correlation between their equity 
returns. When the credit index correlation between the counterparty and the 
reference entity is zero, the impact of counterparty default risk is very small. 
However, as the correlation increases and the credit quality of the counterparty 
declines, counterparty default risk has a bigger effect. 
7. CDS with maturity of 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 5-year, 7-year, or 10-year are 
available in the market. However, CDS with maturity of 5-year are most widely 
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transited in the market. 5-year single-name CDS is regarded as the fundamental 
of the credit derivatives market. Hence, this study focuses on 5-year single-name 
CDS. 
8. When calculating the basis, only 106 entities in our sample satisfy the 
requirement that firms need to have bonds both with time-to-maturity less than 5 
years and more than 5 years in order to interpolate the 5-year yield. 
9. Another way is using linear interpolation to obtain daily debt levels based on 
quarterly data. However, the results would not be affected by this interpolation. 
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Table 1 CDS B/A Spread Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports pooled time-series and cross-sectional summary statistics of daily 
average five-year single name CDS bid-ask spread in basis points from June 2002 to 
April 2006. CDS quotes are from Bloomberg. The sample is formed by the following 
requirements: (1) non-sovereign US entities; (2) fundamental data is available from 
Compustat database, (3) has at least 100 observations of CDS quotes and option implied 
volatility; (4) bond issues information is available from Mergent FISD.  
Q1 is the first quartile, Q3 is the third quartile, N is the number of firms in the sample. 
Rating Group 1 includes firms that are rated at AAA, AA, or A. Rating Group 2 formed 
by firms that are rated at BBB, while firms in rating Group 3 are rated at BB or B. 
 
 Rating Group 
 All AAA, AA or A BBB BB or B 
N 124 40 64 20 
Mean 9.56 6.10 8.09 21.26 
Median 6.22 5.25 6.06 11.33 
Q1 5 4.67 5 7.5 
Q3 9 6.80 8.33 25.00 
Minimum 0 0 0 2.50 
Maximum 415 88.33 415 300 
Std 14.69 3.06 7.99 30.96 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
 
This table shows the overall summary statistics of the variables as well as the summary 
statistics by rating groups. Rating groups are categorized as specified in the previous 
table. 
Bond Age = Average Bond Age, Bond Amount = Bond Total Outstanding Amounts, 
Bond Mrt = Average Time-to-maturity of Active Bonds, Assets = Total Assets / CPI, 
OPIV = Option Implied Volatility. 
 
Panel A: Overall Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std  Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Bond Age (year) 5.06  4.98  2.32  0.003  14.10
Bond Amt (m$) 7.76  3.11 20.58 0.043 215.97
Bond Mtr (year) 10.98  9.64 6.33 0.563 42.47
Leverage 0.31  0.28  0.18 0.0062 0.96
Assets (b$) 30.90  15.16 72.00  1.99  69.07
Option IV 0.45  0.37  0.31  0.072 11.49
CDS Spread (bp) 101.46  50.00  151.16  5.00  3472.00
CDS B/A Spread (bp) 9.56  6.22  14.69  0  415.00
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Panel B: Rating Group Statistics 
AAA, AA or A BBB BB or B Variable 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Bond Age (year) 5.28  5.06 5.22  5.32 4.08 3.65
Issue Size (m$) 12.82  3.63  5.95  3.03 3.70  2.58  
Bond Mrt (year) 10.80  8.83 11.43 10.21 9.88 9.24
Leverage 0.21  0.18  0.32  0.30  0.44  0.47  
Assets (b$) 47.32  24.79 26.59  14.12  13.07  10.10  
Option IV 0.38  0.32  0.43  0.36  0.62  0.54  
CDS Spread (bp) 32.36  25.68 89.01  57.00 280.12  225.00  
CDS B/A Spread (bp) 6.10  5.25 8.09  6.06 21.26  11.33  
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Table 3 Correlations 
 
This table shows the correlation between CDS bid-ask spread and bond liquidity 
measure and firm fundamentals. 
Bond Age = Average Bond Age, Bond Amount = Bond Total Outstanding Amounts, Bond 
Maturity = Average Time-to-maturity of Active Bonds, Assets = Total Assets / CPI, OPIV = 
Option Implied Volatility, 
Book Value of DebtLEV= Leverage Ratio=  
Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt
 
Where market value of equity is calculated as stock price multiplied by the number of 
shares outstanding. The book value of debt is the sum of short-term debt (Compustat 
quarterly file data item 45) and long-term debt (item 51). Debt level is only available at 
quarterly frequency. We replace the missing values with the previous debt level. 
 
Variable Bond 
Age 
Issue 
Size 
Bond 
Maturity 
Lev Total 
Assets 
Option 
IV 
CDS 
B/A 
Age 1.000  
Issue Size -0.0677 1.000  
Maturity -0.0615 0.0619 1.000  
Leverage -0.0012 -0.0051 0.0249 1.000  
Assets -0.0393 0.199 0.0981 0.295 1.000  
OPIV -0.0591 0.0126 0.0237 0.221 0.0597 1.000 
CDS B/A -0.0709 -0.0365 -0.0108 0.327 -0.030 0.251 1.000
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Table 4 Relationship between Change in CDS and Change in Bid-ask Spread  
 
This table reports the relationship between the change in CDS price and the change in 
CDS bid-ask spread using all kinds of models. We check the relationship use the change 
in CDS bid-ask spread as the only explanatory variable as well as include the change in 
option implied volatility in the regression.  
The panel data models are as follows: 
it 1, it itCDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  + itα β ε∆ ∆  
it 1, it 2 , it itCDS M id Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  ++  OPIV  it itα β β∆ ∆ ε∆ +  
The time series models are as follows: 
it 1 it tCDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  + t tα β ε∆ ∆  
it 1 it 2 it tCDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  + OPIV  + t t tα β β∆ ∆ ε∆
t
 
The Cross-sectional models are as follows: 
t 1 tCDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  + t tα β ε∆ ∆  
t 1 t 2CDS Mid Price  =  +  CDS Bid-ask Spread  +  OPIV  t t t t tα β β∆ ∆ ε∆  
Panel A, Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D are results of panel data models. Panel E reports 
results form time series models. Panel F reports results from Cross-sectional models. 
 Panel A: Panel Data Models 
 α t-value 1β t-value 2β  t-value
CDS B/A Spread∆  -1.04 -1.07 0.72 45.51***  
Included OPIV ∆ -1.03 -1.07 0.715 45.46*** 1.25 5.47***
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 Panel B: Grouped by leverage ratio 
 α  t-value 1β  t-value 2β  t-value 
Group 1 -0.02 -0.09 0.42 18.71***  
Group 2 0.008 0.02 0.36 19.49***  
Group 3 -1.01 -0.67 0.98 30.86***  
Including IV   
Group 1 -0.018 -0.097 0.416 18.68*** 0.155 1.14
Group 2 0.007 0.01 0.29 19.51*** 1.47 6.46***
Group 3 -1.00 -0.66 0.97 30.82*** 1.87 3.25***
 
Panel C: Grouped by Total Assets 
 α  t-value 1β  t-value 2β  t-value 
Group 1 -0.006 -0.00 2.29 41.60***  
Group 2 -1.04 -1.19 0.69 32.13***  
Group 3 -1.31 -1.62 0.25 14.15***  
Including IV   
Group 1 -0.007 -0.01 2.28 41.59*** 0.84 1.80*
Group 2 -1.03 -1.19 0.686 32.01*** 1.95 4.90***
Group 3 -1.31 -1.62 0.25 14.16*** 1.10 3.79***
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Panel D: Grouped by Rating 
 α  t-value 1β  t-value 2β  t-value 
AAA, AA or A -0.02 -0.14 0.70 48.66***  
BBB 0.009 0.02 0.18 12.94***  
BB or B -0.95 -0.46 1.53 27.92***  
AAA, AA or A -0.019 -0.14 0.70 48.67*** 0.33 2.40**
BBB 0.008 0.01 0.17 12.91*** 0.84 4.54***
BB or B -0.94 0.46 1.52 27.88*** 2.71 2.72***
Panel E: Time Series Regression by Individual CDS Including Option Implied Volatility 
ALL α  T-Value 1β T-Value 2β  T-Value
CDS B/A Spread∆  -0.038 -0.53 0.57 4.90***  
Included OPIV ∆ -0.04 -0.59 0.573 4.86*** 1.774 3.28***
Different Ratings   
AAA/AA/A -0.057 -5.20** 0.516 3.64*** 0.332 1.52
BBB -0.058 -1.01 0.316 2.58***   2.323  2.84***
BB/B 0.0495 0.13 1.511 2.97*** 2.901 1.43
Panel F: Cross-sectional Method 
 α  T-Value 1β T-Value 2β  T-Value
CDS B/A Spread∆  -0.165 -1.76* 0.1415 5.6***  
Included OPIV ∆ -0.175 -1.96** 0.1416 5.76*** 0.7048 2.22**
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Table 5 Long-Run Relationship between CDS Price and CDS Bid-ask Spread 
 
The last two columns of this table present Johansen trace test statistics for the number of 
cointegrating relations between the CDS price and the CDS bid-ask spread. A constant is 
included in the long-term relation, and the number of lags in the underlying vector 
autoregression is optimized using the AIC for each entity. Rejection of the null at 5% 
level is indicated by a superscript *. The 5% critical value for Rank 0 and Rank 1 are 
12.21 and 4.14 respectively. 
 
No. of Cointegrating 
Vectors CUSIP CONAME 
None At Most 1
001957 A T & T CORP 32.93* 11.05*
008916 AGRIUM INC 116.13* 15.45*
009158 AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC 13.99* 2.39
013104 ALBERTSONS INC 10.96 0.35
013716 ALCAN INC 11.97 1.64
013817 ALCOA INC 18.60* 0.47
020039 ALLTEL CORP 18.70* 6.08*
031162 AMGEN INC 15.9* 1.27
042735 ARROW ELECTRONICS INC 67.69* 1.84
043353 ARVINMERITOR INC 7.67 0.38
053332 AUTOZONE INC 15.02* 0.67
053807 AVNET INC 34.22* 4.80*
057224 BAKER HUGHES INC 15.13* 4.17*
071813 BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 8.59 0.89
079860 BELLSOUTH CORP 24.26* 1.47
091797 BLACK & DECKER CORP 7.10 0.07
097023 BOEING CO 87.82* 7.88*
101137 BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 8.04 0.24
102183 BOWATER INC 9.16 0.50
110122 BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO 11.55 0.95
12189T BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE CP 17.91* 2.22
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126408 C S X CORP 14.72* 1.71
126650 C V S CORP 9.67 1.32
134429 CAMPBELL SOUP CO 14.05* 4.20*
14149Y CARDINAL HEALTH INC 5.79 1.53
149123 CATERPILLAR INC 16.56* 1.40
152312 CENTEX CORP 76.09* 4.54*
156700 CENTURYTEL INC 40.51* 18.78*
170040 CHIRON CORP 51.80* 4.63*
17453B CITIZENS COMMUNICATIONS CO 18.08* 3.27
184502 CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS INC 208.41* 1.38
191219 COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC 79.42* 2.35
205363 COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP 57.61* 2.96
205887 CONAGRA INC 7.21 1.02
219350 CORNING INC 55.04* 5.23
224044 COX COMMUNICATIONS INC NEW 69.18* 2.42
231021 CUMMINS INC 16.38* 0.51
235811 DANA CORP 22.30* 0.67
244199 DEERE & CO 23.69* 2.55
25179M DEVON ENERGY CORP NEW 24.37* 3.08
254687 DISNEY WALT CO 89.87* 1.30
260543 DOW CHEMICAL CO 26.23* 1.58
263534 DU PONT E I DE NEMOURS & CO 12.67* 0.81
277432 EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO 45.49* 1.10
277461 EASTMAN KODAK CO 11.47 0.03
278058 EATON CORP 8.82 1.89
285661 ELECTRONIC DATA SYS CORP NEW 55.35* 2.02
291011 EMERSON ELECTRIC CO 14.93* 1.87
31428X FEDEX CORP 22.44* 4.38*
345370 FORD MOTOR CO DEL 11.14 0.49
364760 GAP INC 46.67* 12.78*
369604 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 9.86 1.85
370334 GENERAL MILLS INC 9.90 1.06
370442 GENERAL MOTORS CORP 12.17 1.33
373298 GEORGIA PACIFIC CORP 44.27* 0.54
382388 GOODRICH CORP 27.91* 4.27*
382550 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBR CO 9.94 0.42
404119 H C A INC 83.28* 0.46
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406216 HALLIBURTON COMPANY 43.11* 9.52*
423074 HEINZ H J CO 4.93 0.19
428236 HEWLETT PACKARD CO 40.50* 2.38
432848 HILTON HOTELS CORP 21.10* 0.87
437076 HOME DEPOT INC 22.06* 2.20
438516 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC 42.70* 3.15
459200 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS COR 16.58* 2.15
460146 INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO 53.49* 0.56
460690 INTERPUBLIC GROUP COS INC 36.84* 0.89
480074 JONES APPAREL GROUP INC 2.79 0.37
487836 KELLOGG CO 28.67* 3.77
492386 KERR MCGEE CORP 9.03 0.81
501044 KROGER COMPANY 217.47* 0.79
521865 LEAR CORP 3.60 0.05
526057 LENNAR CORP 55.89* 0.12
532457 LILLY ELI & CO 19.75* 7.67*
539830 LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 14.91* 2.22
540424 LOEWS CORP 49.68* 4.74*
548661 LOWES COMPANIES INC 34.72* 2.49
552953 M G M MIRAGE 9.66 0.74
571903 MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC NEW 56.16* 2.14
574599 MASCO CORP 15.66* 0.15
577081 MATTEL INC 9.41 0.01
577778 MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO 59.08* 0.35
578592 MAYTAG CORP 6.04 0.16
580135 MCDONALDS CORP 19.04* 0.83
585055 MEDTRONIC INC 9.25 1.68
620076 MOTOROLA INC 39.32* 2.45
651229 NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC 17.85* 1.02
655844 NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP 18.80* 4.69*
666807 NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 57.71* 9.57*
674599 OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 20.53* 3.40
681919 OMNICOM GROUP INC 121.74* 16.97*
693506 P P G INDUSTRIES INC 7.87 0.003
717265 PHELPS DODGE CORP 145.82* 33.72*
724479 PITNEY BOWES INC 7.43 1.41
742718 PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 5.07 0.49
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745867 PULTE HOMES INC 65.89* 4.80*
755111 RAYTHEON CO 53.85* 8.59*
783549 RYDER SYSTEMS INC 13.12* 0.08
786514 SAFEWAY INC 22.25* 1.80
803111 SARA LEE CORP 6.21 0.33
81211K SEALED AIR CORP NEW 51.63* 9.34*
812387 SEARS ROEBUCK & CO 58.63* 1.05
834182 SOLECTRON CORP 18.01* 1.55
844741 SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO 11.62 0.77
852061 SPRINT CORP 124.55* 2.26
855030 STAPLES INC 39.42* 6.94*
868536 SUPERVALU INC 22.77* 0.01
87612E TARGET CORP 17.86* 1.09
879868 TEMPLE INLAND INC 9.28 1.04
88033G TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 19.24* 0.30
882508 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 37.39* 6.65*
883203 TEXTRON INC 29.97* 2.97
896047 TRIBUNE COMPANY NEW 5.40 0.12
902494 TYSON FOODS INC 34.56* 0.89
907818 UNION PACIFIC CORP 11.70 1.03
913017 UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 4.36 1.46
91913Y VALERO ENERGY CORP NEW 100.62* 1.86
92839U VISTEON CORP 11.16 0.14
931142 WAL MART STORES INC 10.20 0.96
94106L WASTE MANAGEMENT INC DEL 35.71* 2.02
962166 WEYERHAEUSER CO 36.07* 1.33
963320 WHIRLPOOL CORP 10.38 0.12
969457 WILLIAMS COS 18.03* 3.78
984121 XEROX CORP 19.55* 5.49*
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Table 6 Cross-Sectional Method 
 
This table reports the results of Cross-sectional method. The model is as follows:  
i 0 1 2 3 4
5 6
CDS B/A Spread
                                                          
                                                                          
i i i i
i i i
Age AMT MRT LEV
Assets OPIV
β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +
     1, 2,...,        i N=
 
Rating Group 1 includes firms that are rated at AAA, AA or A. Rating Group 2 covers 
firms rated at BBB. Rating Group 3 are firms rated BB or B. Rating Group 2 contains 
the majority of the whole sample. Age = Average Bond Age, AMT = Total Amount of 
Outstanding Bonds, MRT = Average Time-to-maturity of Outstanding Bonds, Assets = 
Total Assets / CPI, OPIV = Option Implied Volatility, 
Book Value of DebtLEV= Leverage Ratio=  
Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Debt
. 
Estimates significant at 10% level are superscript by *. Estimates significant at 5% level 
are superscript by **. Estimates significant at 1% level are superscript by ***. 
                                  Panel A: Overall Results 
Variables Coef. T-value 
Intercept -1.147 -3.79***
Age -0.382 -16.11***
AMT -0.01 -6.48***
Maturity 0.025 3.01***
LEV 22.29 28.61 ***
Assets -39 -21.08***
OPIV 14.10 20.72***
R-Square 0.23 
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Panel B: Grouped by Rating 
AAA, AA or A BBB BB or B Variable 
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value
Intercept 5.71 25.07*** 7.26 15.91*** -26.43 -1.23
Age 0.055 3.79*** -0.256 -6.91*** 6.37 1.09
AMT -0.05 -3.87*** -0.08 -18.66*** 7.42 1.58
Maturity 0.012 1.54 -0.086 -7.71*** -0.208 -0.18
LEV 0.08 0.33 1.12 3.22*** -1.99 -0.03
Assets -11 -7.41*** -11 -1.94** -0.001 -1.15
OPIV 1.51 4.94*** 7.24 11.21*** 46.09 1.68*
Adj. R2 0.088 0.138 0.079 
 
Panel C: Grouped by Option Implied Volatility 
Least Volatile Median Volatile Most Volatile Variable 
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value Coef. T-value
Intercept 10.70 4.73*** 8.71 36.10*** 2.13 3.13***
Age -0.216 -1.13 -0.141 -9.11*** -0.54 -7.72***
AMT -0.17 -3.98*** -0.008 -5.26*** -0.33 -5.10***
Maturity -0.113 -2.17** -0.095 -14.01*** 0.053 1.76*
LEV -0.242 -0.24 5.41 14.78*** 45.33 24.21***
Assets 0.84 0.10 -40 -14.33*** -9.7 -0.81
Adj. R2 0.056 0.051 0.167 
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Panel D: Time sub-samples 
2002.6-2004.6 2004.7-2006.4 Variable 
Coef. T-value Coef. T-value 
Intercept -6.34 -10.06*** 3.94 38.94*** 
Age -0.523 -12.06*** -0.226 -31.72*** 
AMT -0.008 -3.06*** -0.013 -7.33*** 
Maturity 0.069 4.54*** -0.024 -12.16*** 
LEV 32.98 26.93*** 10.42 50.99*** 
Assets -64 -22.24*** -11 -17.00*** 
OPIV 23.43 22.03*** 3.74 16.75*** 
Adj. R2 0.1997 0.2352 
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Figure 1 Global Credit Derivatives Market in $bn of Notional Amount 
 
 
Source: British Bankers’ Association (BBA) Credit Derivatives Report 2006 
 
Figure 2 Credit Derivatives Products (in Notional Amount) 
 
Source: BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2006 
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Figure 3 Rating of Underlying CDS (in percentage of Notional Amount) 
 
 
 
Source: BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2006 
 
Figure 4 Mean CDS Bid/Ask Spread (bp) 
 
 52
Figure 5 Time Series of Credit Basis (bp) 
 
 
Figure 5 displays the basis between mean credit spread and mean CDS price measured in 
basis point. 
 
Figure 6 Means of the Variables in Rating Groups 
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Appendix A: CDS data from Bloomberg 
 
The CDS data are downloaded from Bloomberg terminal. The CDS data in 
Bloomberg is from CMA DataVisionTM composite prices—prices that are sourced from 
the front offices of the leading investment banks, hedge funds and asset managers. CMA 
DataVisionTM provides data for more than 2,000 single name CDS, indices and tranches 
uniquely delivered by 5pm London and 5pm New York time. Daily CDS spreads based 
on real-time indicative quotes are from the best vantage point: buy-side front office. 
CMA’s Data Consortium of 30 buy-side firms continuously provides average spreads 
based on observed quotes, which are more representative of the day’s trading.  
In Bloomberg, regional end-of-day price choices include CMA (CMAN / CMAL) for 
New York and London market regions as well as Bloomberg generic composite price 
(CBGN / CBGT / CBGL), which are snapshot of intraday prices taken at 5:00 pm local 
time in each of the  three regions (New York, Tokyo, and London). The Bloomberg 
generic intraday price is the mean of all contributor prices that have been updated during 
the previous 24 hours. Each source has a different open/close time that corresponds with 
the appropriate market, i.e., New York, Tokyo, and London. A generic spread appears 
only if at least two prices from different outside contributors have been contributed 
within the last 24 hours. 
Before downloading the data from Bloomberg, you would better set the default CDS 
contributors. In our case, we choose CBGN (Bloomberg generic composite price in New 
York) as the default contributor of the CDS quotes. The reason we choose CBGN as the 
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default CDS contributor is that it provides the largest sample and longest data that are 
available to us. Once you have set the default CDS contributors, you can open the excel 
file and use Bloomberg add-in in excel to download the data you needed. In Bloomberg, 
every CDS has an identical ticker which can be used to reach certain name of CDS. The 
list of CDS names and their reference information are available from Bloomberg. 
The Bloomberg™ JP Morgan CDS valuation model is a standard methodology 
accepted by the market, by which you can calculate the fair value of certain CDS and 
create your deal. It uses a (time changed) Poisson process to drive the hazard rate and 
uses an assumed recovery rate on default.  
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Appendix B: Corporate Entities with CDS and Bond Market Data in Our Sample 
from June 2002 to April 2006 
 
Company Name N 
Mean B/A 
Spread 
Mean CDS 
Level 
AT&T CORP 402 11.823 180.294
AGRIUM INC 428 7.289 51.735
AIR PRODUCTS & CHEMICALS INC 231 5.137 19.887
ALBERTSONS INC 482 6.569 105.089
ALCAN ALUMINUM LTD 332 6.481 34.325
ALCOA INC 468 6.169 34.097
ALLTEL CORP 393 6.072 41.780
AMGEN INC 522 5.715 20.288
ARROW ELECTRONICS INC 654 12.303 172.969
ARVINMERITOR INC 414 21.110 325.881
AUTOZONE INC 472 8.747 69.998
AVNET INC 572 15.263 207.373
BAKER HUGHES INC 365 6.811 26.791
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 455 5.179 34.299
BELLSOUTH CORP 461 6.208 45.208
BLACK & DECKER CORP 202 6.735 35.735
BOEING CO 462 8.996 42.188
BOSTON SCIENTIFIC CORP 310 4.929 34.540
BOWATER INC 360 16.611 295.685
BRISTOL MYERS SQUIBB CO 318 4.846 26.651
BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE CP 453 6.798 38.938
CSV CORP 424 6.492 50.070
CVS CORP 402 6.372 31.117
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CAMPBELL SOUP CO 357 5.776 27.078
CARDINAL HEALTH INC 327 5.233 54.052
CATERPILLAR INC 506 6.109 29.584
CENTEX CORP 463 7.276 66.776
CENTURYTEL INC 435 8.509 88.773
CHIRON CORP 631 6.167 37.500
CITIZENS COMMUNICATIONS CO 439 18.047 231.613
CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS INC 539 9.863 133.138
COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC 396 5.802 24.139
COMPUTER SCIENCES CORP 612 5.973 56.484
CONAGRA INC 379 5.991 43.145
CORNING INC 409 9.273 116.627
COX COMMUNICATIONS INC NEW 443 11.590 141.832
CUMMINS ENGINE INC 290 30.711 255.987
DANA CORP 276 19.095 427.340
DEERE & CO 479 5.958 32.935
DEVON ENERGY CORP NEW 556 6.320 52.485
DISNEY WALT CO 646 6.559 60.202
DOW CHEMICAL CO 476 7.159 62.050
DU PONT E I DE NEMOURS & CO 481 5.047 21.750
EASTMAN CHEMICAL CO 399 7.720 62.936
EASTMAN KODAK CO 582 8.335 156.954
EATON CORP 313 7.604 31.409
ELECTRONIC DATA SYS CORP NEW 531 11.404 176.275
EMERSON ELECTRIC CO 349 5.467 24.271
FEDEX CORP 450 7.977 36.964
FORD MOTOR CO DEL 436 12.567 415.915
GAP INC 411 16.201 174.592
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 454 5.367 38.797
 58
GENERAL MILLS INC 452 5.890 45.519
GENERAL MOTORS CORP 440 12.132 437.689
GEORGIA PACIFIC CORP 449 32.714 313.504
GOODRICH B F CO 432 10.476 100.681
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBR CO 541 78.047 659.005
H C A HEALTHCARE CO 225 8.666 137.562
HALLIBURTON COMPANY 351 8.337 71.518
HEINZ H J CO 316 5.511 29.899
HEWLETT PACKARD CO 514 7.249 42.217
HILTON HOTELS CORP 442 14.455 168.796
HOME DEPOT INC 359 5.527 14.111
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC 393 7.164 33.096
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHS COR 564 5.643 30.719
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO 476 6.495 71.375
INTERPUBLIC GROUP COS INC 481 18.622 249.950
JONES APPAREL GROUP INC 272 7.302 68.814
KELLOGG CO 358 6.533 26.607
KERR MCGEE CORP 420 6.274 85.027
KROGER COMPANY 658 9.325 72.213
LEAR CORP 326 13.871 291.739
LENNAR CORP 276 5.694 67.538
LILLY ELI & CO 371 6.437 17.454
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 458 6.411 41.889
LOEWS CORP 266 5.033 36.727
LOWES COMPANIES INC 449 6.106 26.349
M G M MIRAGE 559 13.508 201.027
MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL INC NEW 488 7.605 59.718
MASCO CORP 326 5.455 40.937
MATTEL INC 402 6.027 50.345
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MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO 401 6.827 58.334
MAYTAG CORP 242 8.000 148.418
MCDONALDS CORP 618 6.516 30.816
MEDTRONIC INC 257 6.605 17.177
MOTOROLA INC 498 9.931 121.166
NEWELL RUBBERMAID INC 375 7.412 53.729
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORP 393 6.992 37.792
NORTHROP GRUMMAN CORP 428 7.630 46.696
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 410 6.642 39.059
OMNICOM GROUP INC 448 7.556 50.960
P P G INDUSTRIES INC 331 6.116 24.635
PHELPS DODGE CORP 317 12.593 78.064
PITNEY BOWES INC 209 7.488 25.381
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 367 5.507 16.852
PULTE CORP 469 8.023 82.265
RAYTHEON CO 452 7.071 69.674
RYDER SYSTEMS INC 238 6.474 46.227
SAFEWAY INC 573 7.365 72.729
SARA LEE CORP 268 5.015 40.697
SEALED AIR CORP NEW 345 6.259 60.431
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO 327 10.612 124.980
SOLECTRON CORP 412 15.049 299.839
SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO 422 5.866 46.805
SPRINT CORP 432 18.681 207.250
STAPLES INC 386 9.088 46.100
SUPERVALU INC 294 6.585 78.372
TARGET CORP 565 5.975 27.421
TEMPLE INLAND INC 228 7.945 70.584
TENET HEALTHCARE CORP 369 30.523 395.121
 60
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS INC 375 5.484 30.352
TEXTRON INC 474 7.513 48.003
TRIBUNE COMPANY NEW 175 3.707 52.422
TYSON FOODS INC 375 8.059 86.510
UNION PACIFIC CORP 329 6.746 38.202
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 176 4.109 17.439
VALERO ENERGY CORP NEW 532 7.557 85.944
VISTEON CORP 513 13.618 445.246
WAL MART STORES INC 540 5.114 17.286
WASTE MANAGEMENT INC DEL 239 6.193 50.395
WEYERHAEUSER CO 448 5.972 64.956
WHIRLPOOL CORP 281 6.303 51.235
WILLIAMS COS 196 12.469 161.046
XEROX CORP 250 11.168 150.437
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